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 Liberal Neutrality and Charitable Purposes  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Influential streams of liberal political thought have argued that the state ought to be a neutral 
set of institutions that do not pursue or impose particular conceptions of the good. According 
to this perspective, the state does not have purposes of its own or pass judgement on what it 
means to lead the good life. As Jonathan Quong summarises, a liberal state should be limited 
to ‘a fair framework of rules and institutions to regulate the distribution of the burdens and 
benefits of social cooperation’. The neutral framework is one ‘within which each citizen is 
allowed to pursue their own conception of the good life, whatever that may be’ (Quong, 2005: 
302). Many liberals similarly defend, in some form or another, state neutrality.  
 
Charitable or altruistic activity is widely regarded as a valuable component of civil society1 
and such activity should be facilitated (see Titmuss, 1970). In UK law, the distinctive status of 
charitable organisations within civil society is promoted by state recognition and fiscal 
support, among other measures. Yet, with the designation of charitable status, the state is 
granting a set of privileges to organisations that pursue particular purposes deemed as 
‘charitable’. In granting charitable status the state makes a value judgement about certain 
goods; it tells us that a given set of conceptions are worthy of special provisions, such as tax 
exemptions, that are not available to the pursuit of other conceptions. In short, the legislation 
appears to contravene liberal neutrality.  
 
The task of this paper is twofold. First, to explicate the prima facie tension between charity 
law and liberal neutrality. Second, to provide some insight into whether or not the two can be 
reconciled by exploring various conceptions of liberal neutrality. Underlying these two tasks 
is a methodological issue, namely what would count as a satisfactory reconciliation between 
liberal neutrality and charity law. I shall employ a particular version of reflective equilibrium, 
considering the neutrality theory against the well-established principles of charity law, 
adjusting the former or latter where seems appropriate. Thus, neither the theory nor the 
principles are taken as trumps. It seems reasonable to expect there to not being a single, 
unified conception that satisfies all examples of charitable activity. I anticipate only partial 
consistency and so there will inevitably be loose ends. For that reason, the paper’s conclusion 
is in the conditional: if one is a neutralist then one must be prepared to exclude some present 
categories and reform others. If, on the other hand, one is persuaded more by the tradition 
and/or value of the present categories then one must jettison neutrality. To provide some 
context to the problem I will first briefly outline elements of charity law. 
 
Charity Law 
 
In UK law, the formal definition of charitable purposes can be traced back to the Statute of 
Charitable Uses 1601 (1601 Act hereafter). The act sought first to direct funds towards 
                                                
I am indebted to Albert Weale for his time and comments on many drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank 
the anonymous referees, Robert Jubb and the UCL Political Theory Workshop for their comments and criticisms.  
1 Some may find this controversial, particularly those who subscribe to a ‘justice not charity’ view. Typically this 
view uses ‘charity’ in the sense of ad-hoc, perhaps pity-based, material giving – hence the demand for justice not 
charity. This paper refers to the public policy understanding of charity; identified by the purposes set out in 
Table 1 below.  
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identified purposes such as social care and second, to reform abuse of property given to 
charities by identifying certain purposes that would thereafter be known as charitable. The 
preamble to the 1601 Act sets out such purposes, ranging from the relief of the poor to the 
repair of highways and bridges. The list was not intended to be exhaustive of charitable 
purposes but as illustrative for the judiciary in future case law. It is interesting to note that a 
sense of ‘social control’ features in the 1601 Act, such as helping poor maids into marriage 
and the rehabilitation of prisoners. Kerry O’Halloran notes such purposes indicate a 
‘legislative intent to promote congruity between the agendas of charities and government on 
the assumption that both share a common interest in activities which conform with and tend to 
preserve the values of contemporary society’ (O’Halloran, 2007: 63). It suggests a pattern of 
thought in the legislation where the state promotes certain activities it believes to be 
worthwhile. 
 
For four centuries the definition of charitable purposes was explicated in a body of case law, 
where for a purpose to be charitable it would need to come within the ‘spirit and intendment’ 
of the 1601 Act preamble. In Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax vs. Pemsel 
(1891), Lord Macnaghten extracted four heads of charitable purposes from the 1601 Act: the 
relief of poverty, the advancement of education, the advancement of religion and other 
benefits to the community not covered by the preceding categories. The 1601 Act, Pemsel and 
subsequent case law formed what would become long-standing principles in the classification 
of charitable purposes, namely that they must be provided for the public benefit, that they 
must be exclusively charitable and conform to Macnaghten’s four heads or the ‘spirit and 
intendment’ rule. 
 
Nevertheless charity law was not a unified body of jurisprudence and charitable purposes still 
eluded legislative definition. The Charities Act 1992 and 1993 sought to bolster the 
supervision and support of charities but avoided definitional matters so as not to risk the 
flexibility of charity law to keep pace with contemporary society. The Charities Act 2006 
(2006 Act hereafter) was introduced primarily to reform the complex and confused system of 
governance for charitable organisations in England and Wales2. The 2006 Act introduced, 
among other provisions, a new extensive list of charitable purposes and maintained the 
principles of being exclusively charitable and for the public benefit. Thus, there is now an 
explicit classification of charitable purposes on the statute books. Prior to the 2006 Act, 
organisations that engaged in the charitable purposes endorsed in Pemsel were assumed, by 
virtue of having those purposes, to be charitable. The 2006 Act removed the presumption that 
the above provide public benefit and so now all organisations seeking to remain or become 
charities are required to meet a public benefit test. The 2006 Act explicitly defines a 
charitable purpose as one that falls within the list of thirteen categories contained in the 
legislation, including the Pemsel categories of poverty relief and the advancement of 
education or religion. Additional categories include the advancement of health, the 
advancement of the arts, and the advancement of human rights or equality.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
                                                
2 England and Wales form a single jurisdiction in charity law. For the sake of clarity and to keep the scope of this 
paper manageable I shall focus solely on the charity law of England and Wales. I see no reason why, in theory, 
the principles could not be applied elsewhere. It should be noted, however, that using the reflective equilibrium 
method might yield a proposal more in favour of neutrality were charity to be a significantly less important 
institution than it is in the UK.  
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The tension between charity law and liberal neutrality comes to light when we see that the 
legal recognition of charitable status is not a value-free decision. Such decisions tell us that 
the pursuit of particular conceptions of the good is worthy of special advantages that are not 
granted for the pursuit of other conceptions. Fiscal advantages, such as tax exemptions, ease 
their pursuit while the granting of charitable status itself provides a level of approval from the 
state3. The purpose of this paper is to survey how the liberal neutralist might account for the 
granting of these special advantages. At this point it is helpful to explicate the theoretical 
background. 
 
Neutrality 
 
Neutrality is a familiar concept that is applicable in a variety of contexts. Our common 
understanding relates to an agent’s non-involvement in a dispute concerning two or more 
other agents. The political context in which it is perhaps most familiar is international 
relations. Here a neutral state is one that refrains from taking sides in an international dispute 
or conflict such as Switzerland during World War II. The context that concerns us here is 
within the modern state. As Peter Jones states, ‘within liberal political theory, the phrase 
neutral state has come to describe not the external posture of a state but an idea of what its 
internal arrangements should be’ (Jones, 1989: 9 emphasis added). The discussion of 
neutrality in this internal sense (and as a defining characteristic of liberalism) is widely 
regarded to have surfaced in the 1970s in significant works by Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls 
and others (Wall & Klosko, 2003b: 1-2; Goodin & Reeve, 1989b: 1). Its emergence correlates 
with the understanding of the plurality of conceptions of the good as a permanent and 
desirable feature of modern societies (Larmore, 1987: 43; Kukathas, 1992: 228-30).  
 
But what is meant by conception of the good in this context? Neutralists (and non-neutralists) 
are often vague in their definition and use it interchangeably with other related terms such as 
ideas, values and beliefs. Following the consensus, I shall consider it to include not only 
comprehensive moral, religious and philosophical doctrines but also ‘ordinary’ or ‘everyday’ 
judgements about which activities or ideals are worthwhile or important. This approach does 
not privilege loftier or broader questions about the good over everyday ones; the former might 
include ‘what virtues should I cultivate?’ and the latter, ‘what leisure activities should I 
pursue?’ As Dworkin writes, ‘the scholar who values a life of contemplation has such a 
conception; so does the television-watching, beer-drinking citizen who is fond of saying “this 
is the life”’ (Dworkin, 1978: 127; see also Jones, 1989: 13). Of course comprehensive 
doctrines may determine one’s answer to ordinary questions and in this sense we might think 
of ordinary judgements as particular expressions or features of the comprehensive doctrine 
one supposedly holds. There is no normative reason why the state ought to be neutral about 
loftier, more philosophical ideas but not ordinary ones4. Likewise, it would make little sense 
to be neutral among ordinary judgements but favour (or hinder) a comprehensive view. As I 
                                                
3 Several theoretical questions arise regarding the role of charities in our society. For instance, we would be 
inclined to ask what might be the role of charities in a society in which expenditure on health and education are 
some of the largest in the public budget. James Douglas addresses this question in Why Charity?, suggesting we 
require a third-sector as a response to market and state failure (Douglas, 1983). The validity of this gap-filling 
argument has been contested (Ware, 1989: 23-9), though Douglas himself concedes a full rationale needs to 
draw on, among other disciplines, political philosophy and the theories of distributive justice (Douglas, 1983: 
160). We may also consider what benefit religious organisations bestow in a real public sense when the status of 
religion has shifted away from the social and political fabric to the private realm of citizens. 
4 Providing that all given ideas conform to liberal principles. This particular restriction is discussed in the final 
section of the paper.  
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hope to demonstrate in the following section, the categories of charitable purposes implicitly, 
and indeed sometimes explicitly, entail ideas about the good at both levels.  
 
There are three broad conceptions of liberal neutrality in the literature: neutrality of aim, of 
effect, and of justification. The first requires that policymakers simply do not aim to promote 
or hinder conceptions of the good. Whether or not policy decisions have either effect is 
irrelevant provided it was not the aim behind the state’s decision. The second requires that 
state decisions may draw on views about the good but must have a neutral effect on all 
concerned conceptions, amounting to an equal effect on conceptions. The third version 
requires that the justification for a given political decision does not draw on views of 
superiority or inferiority of conceptions of the good when justifying (or opposing) said 
decision. Often this third conception draws on contractualist methods, though in principle it 
need not. Neutrality of aim will not be considered here since it is thought neutrality of 
justification is its correct liberal interpretation (see Lecce, 2008: 237). Neutrality of 
justification is the favoured understanding of liberal neutrality among its contemporary 
adherents. That is not to say they share a common view on how the conception ought to be 
fleshed out. Nevertheless, at some level of political matters proponents of neutrality of 
justification share an anti-perfectionist stance. Perfectionism being the view that the state 
ought to promote conceptions of the good insofar as they are deemed valuable conceptions of 
the good (see Raz, 1986; Hurka, 1993; Sher, 1997).  
 
In more recent years the ‘asymmetry objection’ has been the focus of the literature. The 
objection runs as follows: neutralists hold disagreements about the good to be ‘reasonable’ 
thus the state is not permitted to act on reasons grounded in conceptions of good. Yet the state 
is permitted to act on reasons of justice even though disagreements about justice are evidently 
reasonable. Critics argue that neutralists have failed to explain why then such a cut is 
warranted (see Sandel, 1982; Clarke, 1999; Chan, 2000). Neutralists have sought to defuse the 
objection in various ways. For example, Steven Lecce claims that critics are mistaken in their 
focus on specious epistemological differences between the good and justice. Rather, liberal 
neutrality is connected to moral equality and procedural constraints (Lecce, 2003 & 2008). 
Quong argues that disagreements about the good and justice differ in kind according to the 
respective premises shared by participants (Quong, 2005). Despite coming under strong 
criticism, in particular from perfectionists, it is safe to assume that neutrality remains a 
significant position in the liberal tradition. I wish to bracket some of these more technical 
concerns, such as the asymmetry problem, and use the existing literature as a starting point for 
an analysis of charity policy. Liberal neutralists have not tackled the issue of charity policy. 
Some writers have considered the issue of direct funding or subsidisation of certain goods by 
the state, in particular the arts (see Dworkin, 1985; Barry, 1995; Brighouse, 1995). While 
many UK charities do indeed receive subsidies or ‘gift aid’ from the state, the aforementioned 
literature does not consider the particular theoretical problem raised here. 
 
Narrow Neutrality 
 
Charitable organisations are not an institution of the state; they are civil society organisations 
established under legal powers found in the legislation. How then does the neutralist 
understand legislation? Such an understanding is not unified among neutralists given that they 
disagree about the scope of neutrality. Here it is useful to distinguish a comprehensive 
neutrality principle from a narrow one. The narrow principle holds that the constitutional or 
basic framework should be neutral but other political decisions need not be. Whereas the 
former requires that both the basic structure and other political decisions should be neutral. In 
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this section I shall consider the narrow version, which tells us that non-neutral charity law 
need not concern us given that such legislation need not be neutral. Clearly we must address 
this point first given that if the argument were sound then the neutralist would not have a case 
to answer. This issue also leads well into a fuller explanation of what the problem for the 
neutralist is with regard to charity law.  
 
The Scope of Neutrality 
 
Rawls can be read as defending narrow neutrality. The principle of neutrality is implicit in the 
construction of the principles of justice and for Rawls, ‘the primary subject of justice is the 
basic structure of society, or more exactly…major social institutions’ which he understands to 
be ‘the political constitution and the principal economic and social arrangements’ (Rawls, 
1999: 6). Yet while it might be true for the principles of justice, it gives us no reason to 
assume that, for Rawls, neutrality itself does not go beyond the ‘basic structure of society’. 
And elsewhere in A Theory of Justice, Rawls appears to exhibit an anti-perfectionist stance 
that goes further than the fundamentals of society. For example, he writes: 
[T]he principles of justice do not permit subsidising universities and 
institutes, or opera and the theatre, on the grounds that these 
institutions are intrinsically valuable, and that those who engage in 
them are to be supported even at some significant expense to others 
who do not receive compensating benefits. (Rawls, 1999: 291-2)  
Rawls maintains that if such subsidisation is acceptable then the taxes that support it must not 
be raised without consent. The argument is not directed at charitable status but it does show 
that Rawls, in some passages, explicitly rules out perfectionist public policies (Wall & 
Klosko, 2003b: 3)5. Barry’s distinction between neutral and non-neutral political matters is 
more explicit than Rawls. It also lends itself well to our purposes here. Thus I will proceed 
with only Barry’s account. 
 
In Justice as Impartiality, Barry claims that principles of justice must be neutral between 
ideas about the good but other political decisions may appeal to such ideas. This rests, in part, 
on there being a conceptual distinction between justice-based and non-justice-based political 
matters. The constitutional framework is of course justice-based and so must be neutral 
between conceptions of the good. Whereas legislation in a variety of matters may, according 
to Barry, reflect some conceptions of the good. Thus there is an asymmetry of neutrality 
between issues of justice and other political issues. For instance, deciding the curriculum for 
state-run schools must inevitably entail a view about what is and is not worth learning. Barry 
asserts: 
It would be absurd to suggest that there is some way of determining a 
curriculum that is neutral between all conceptions of the good, and it 
is significant that those who support the idea of legislative (as against 
constitutional) neutrality have never attempted to lay out a neutral 
curriculum. (Barry, 1995: 161) 
Regardless of whether or not Barry is correct to suggest that many political decisions 
unavoidably turn on conceptions of the good, his claim does not serve as qualification of the 
conceptual distinction between the constitutional framework and various legislation issues. 
He must show that legislative decisions do not entail matters of justice.  
 
                                                
5 Rawls appears to revise his position later, taking much the same stance as Barry (Rawls, 2005: 214-5). 
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Caney raises a problem for Barry in this regard that sheds light on the issue of whether or not 
charity law is beyond the scope of the principles of neutrality. For him the problem surfaces 
because ‘those matters Barry deems not to raise issues of justice frequently require financial 
support and thus inevitably raise issues of distributive justice’ (Caney, 2000: 105). Richard 
Arneson makes a similar case, specifically with regard to advancing the arts. He cautiously 
argues that it violates neutrality given the interference with citizens’ resources for the pursuit 
of a conception of the good that many may not wish to pursue (Arneson, 2003: 198-9). To 
illustrate let us consider some of the examples of non-neutral (and thus non-justice) legislation 
provided by Barry. He claims that legislation preserving buildings of historical importance, 
protecting areas of natural beauty and advancing the arts may legitimately draw on citizen’s 
views about the good (Barry, 1995: 105)6. Each of these policies, if they are to achieve their 
respective aims, must entail a financial cost that will typically require taxation. ‘People’s 
entitlements (their share of resources) are being affected by these other good-based policies. 
Judgements about the good are therefore influencing who gets what’ (Caney, 2000: 106). 
Thus, Barry’s distinction between justice-based and non-justice-based political decisions is 
undermined given that taxation is required to fund the legislation that reflects particular ideas 
about the good. Accordingly, the restriction of neutrality’s scope to only the constitutional 
framework is undermined by having accepted Barry’s linkage between justice and neutrality. 
 
Let us now examine where charity law is situated in the above debate. We need to establish 
whether or not granting charitable status raises considerations of justice due to a financial cost 
that the taxpayer bears. It is important to note here that the nature of the charity case is 
somewhat different from the examples given above. The latter concerns the use of resources 
collected by the state, whereas in the case of charities it is mostly donations from citizens that 
fund the pursuit of their aims7. So what, if any, financial cost does the public bear? We may 
stretch Caney’s point so as to include tax expenditure. In this context that is to say, by 
granting an organisation fiscal advantages (such as tax exemptions) the state forgoes the tax it 
would have otherwise collected from the given organisation. Thus the resources available to 
individual citizens to pursue their own ideas of the good are more limited than if the state had 
chosen the alternative option of taxing charities. Thus, people’s entitlements remain affected 
by judgements about the worth of certain activities or ideas given that the state has detailed 
what is and is not a charitable purpose.  
 
The above argument, if at all plausible, shows that charity in some sense concerns justice and 
so for supporters of Barry’s distinction, it should also concern the principle of neutrality. I 
wish to set aside this argument, however, for the following reason. I do not share Barry’s 
claim that neutrality is inextricably linked to only justice-related matters. While it is 
understandable that Barry argues that justice ought to be irrelevant to mundane legislation, it 
is not clear, as Quong argues, why we may not consider neutrality within non-justice spheres 
(Quong, 2004). Merely because such decisions may encounter conceptions of the good does 
not provide good reason to abandon neutrality in such contexts. It is difficult to see why the 
neutralist would ignore policies that contradict the heart of the neutrality doctrine. Such a 
tension arises between charity law and liberal neutrality, which ought to be of concern to the 
neutralist on his own terms.  
 
Neutralists cannot ignore charity law when the value judgement entailed in recognising an 
organisation’s purposes as charitable is brought to light. When the state specifies what is 
                                                
6 Note that these are in fact the sorts of activities that are deemed charitable.  
7 Statutory funding is a significant income for certain charitable sectors, such as employment and training 
(NCVO Almanac, 2010: 32). In which case the financial argument would apply as it is in Caney. 
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considered to be charitable it indirectly imparts a view about the value of activities or ideas 
(conceptions of the good). It informs us that the pursuit of a given set of conceptions of the 
good is worthy of special advantages that are not available for the pursuit of other 
conceptions. We need only look to the importance that charities holds in our society to 
recognise that affording charitable status is a significant statement of value. As the Charity 
Commission states, ‘charities play a vital and unique role at the heart of our society’, aiming 
in one sense or another to better society (Charity Commission, 2006). Hence, when the state 
deems an activity or idea as a charitable pursuit, it goes some way to predicating it as a 
valuable pursuit, or more valuable than other goals. Of course the state is not imposing 
conceptions of the good on other citizens, but it does facilitate organisations in the sense that 
they will find it easier to pursue their goals than had they not been granted charitable status 
and fiscal advantages. And so the value judgement also entails a practical consequence as 
such provisions help advance certain conceptions of the good.  
 
In light of the above we can see that it is possible for charity law to contravene the basic 
premise of liberal neutrality. Recall that the general neutrality principle requires that the state 
be neutral between conceptions of the good, refraining from advancing or judging the value of 
particular conceptions of the good. So the problem arises in the current legislation given the 
predication of value that charitable status carries with it. The neutralist then cannot support an 
ad-hoc or separate account for charity policy given that the problem goes to the heart of the 
neutrality doctrine.   
 
To provide some context to the problem let us now look at two examples of the categories of 
charitable purposes. Under the 2006 Act, the advancement of the arts is deemed to be 
charitable, including exhibiting art and the promotion of high standards of various artistic 
pursuits. Suppose that an organisation gains charitable status and fiscal advantages for its 
provision of a particular art form, say opera. Given the inherently subjective nature of art we 
can expect that a sizeable group of citizens do not view opera as valuable art, or at least not 
deserving of state facilitation. Consequently, the state appears to be discriminating between 
different views on a particular art form. Indeed some may hold the view that art altogether is 
not a feature of the good life yet the state appears to be facilitating, in a broad sense, the 
opposite view.   
 
Consider also the category of the advancement of amateur sport where physical or mental 
skills are exerted to promote health. An amateur boxing club appears to meet the basic 
requirement of promoting health given the physical training involved in the sport, provided 
the associated risks were minimised. It seems plausible, however, that some people may 
object to the state facilitating an inherently violent sport. The current guidance provided by 
the Charity Commission for such cases involving dangerous sports brings to light a further 
complication. It states that in some cases an organisation may use a sport as a means of 
achieving a different purpose. ‘In that sort of case, the benefit to the public of the 
organisation’s object may outweigh the dangers inherent in the sport’ (Charity Commission, 
2003). So, for example, we may conceive the boxing club as a source of engagement and 
cohesion particularly among young people in a relatively deprived community. But again, it is 
possible that people will dispute the merits of its method for achieving those goals. In 
reaching a decision one way or another, the state discriminates between ideas about the good.  
 
Neutrality of Effect 
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The neutrality of effect formulation is so-called because it views the impact that policies have 
on citizens’ pursuit of their favoured conceptions of the good as the primary focus of the 
neutrality principle. It requires that the ‘state should not do anything that has the effect – 
whether intended or not – of promoting any particular conception of the good, or of providing 
greater assistance to those who pursue it’ (Wall & Klosko, 2003b: 8). This view is often 
thought to appeal to notions of equal treatment given that the state must not advantage some 
conceptions of the good over others. Alan Montefiore, for example, holds neutrality in this 
regard, stating that it is to do one’s best ‘to help or hinder to an equal degree the parties 
concerned in any situation of competition or conflict’ (Montefiore, 1975: 6). Bringing these 
thoughts together, Jones writes: 
We might therefore infer that, if a state is to remain neutral between 
individuals’ conceptions of the good, it must promote these in equal 
degree or, perhaps, provide individuals with opportunities to promote 
these in equal degree. A state would therefore fail to be neutral to the 
extent that some citizens found their conceptions of the good less 
promoted, or less easily promoted, than those held by others. (Jones, 
1989: 14-5) 
Before we evaluate the above formulation some further clarification is required regarding its 
interpretation and application in the context of charities. 
 
Any plausible interpretation of neutrality of effect would require that the state need only 
equally promote conceptions of the good actually held by citizens rather than the implausible 
case of every imaginable conception of the good (Jones, 1989: 14). In the context of the 
present charity law this is not a real concern given that the categories of charitable purposes 
plainly reflect conceptions actually held in society. A greater concern is whether or not the 
provisions under the 2006 Act do in fact have some bearing on how certain conceptions of the 
good fare in society. If such an effect does not occur then charitable status should not raise 
any concern for the neutralist. For the reasons set out in the previous section, charitable status 
and its associated fiscal advantages have the effect of increasing the promotion of the 
conceptions of the good reflected in the activities and ideas pursued by charities. As the 
Charity Commission states, ‘[t]here are considerable advantages which arise from charitable 
status: reputational – people are more likely to offer time, energy or money to a registered 
charity; opportunity – many grant-makers only give to charities; fiscal – charities receive a 
wide range of tax advantages’ (Charity Commission, 2006). Charitable status gives rise to 
unequal treatment given that such provisions are desirable for citizens in pursuit of their 
conceptions of the good. Thus, conceptions of the good that are not reflected in the designated 
categories of charitable purposes are disadvantaged.  
 
In light of the above it would appear there are two paths for the state according to neutrality of 
effect. One would be for the state to remove the provision of charitable status and tax 
exemptions in order to eliminate the advantages given to conceptions of the good that fall 
within the requirements of the 2006 Act. Surely we can reject this conclusion on the grounds 
that it would effectively bring an end to charitable organisations, at least insofar as being 
distinct from other private associations. The other possibility is that the state equally promotes 
conceptions of the good that are not afforded the advantages of being charitable. It would 
undermine the designation of charitable purposes to afford these other conceptions the same 
provisions so instead, for example, some form of compensation is required, such as financial 
support or special rights. I shall leave the notion of compensation defined in these loose 
financial terms since there is not the space here to develop the theory necessary for a full 
account. In principle there is no reason why such a theory could be constructed. 
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To measure the required level of compensation we need an understanding of what it means to 
equally promote conceptions of the good. Here the formulation encounters considerable 
difficulties. Waldron argues that the ‘main theoretical difficulty is that it involves the 
postulation of some baseline relative to which differential effects of legislation or other state 
action may be measured’ (Waldron, 1989: 67). Jones suggests a possible measure that appeals 
to a principle of equal fulfilment. We establish what the complete fulfilment of each 
conception of the good entails, ‘set out a scale of stages towards complete fulfilment, and then 
try to ensure that individuals were at the same point on that scale’ (Jones, 1989: 16). Jones 
goes on to point out, however, that such a measure would prove highly problematic for 
several reasons; for instance, the internal diversity of conceptions of the good is such that they 
are incommensurable. (Jones, 1989: 16). But supposing they are commensurable, what would 
this mean for the supposed conflict between neutrality and affording charitable status? I 
would argue that even if it were possible to equalise effects via compensation, neutrality of 
effect could not plausibly account for the initial value judgement that charitable status 
conveys. Consider the example of affording abortion advice centres charitable status. To 
equalise the effect of having facilitated the pro-choice conception the state may provide the 
necessary funds for anti-abortion groups to protest against the centre. I do not think such 
compensation, however, satisfies the problem put forward here. Compensation would not be a 
reply to anti-abortionists that argue such centres should not have been afforded charitable 
status in the first instance. 
 
In any case, I am inclined to follow the widely held view that the general premise of neutrality 
of effect is an implausible and undesirable formulation of the principle (Jones, 1989: 16-17; 
Waldron, 1989: 67; Wall & Klosko, 2003b: 8; Lecce, 2008: 236). Most neutralists argue that 
it is not the remit of the state to regulate the success of conceptions of the good. What seems 
to be paramount to most contemporary neutralists is that the state provides a neutral 
justification for its policies. Rather than being only concerned about what effect policies have 
on conceptions of the good, we should be focussed on the content of the law in the first 
instance. In the next section I will examine how this position might work with regards to 
classification of charitable purposes under the 2006 Act.  
 
Neutrality of Justification 
 
The conception requires that policies pursued by the state should be justified independently of 
any appeal to the alleged superiority of conceptions of the good. In doing so, it does not 
invoke ‘controversial’ claims, namely, claims about the value of conceptions of the good that 
are reasonably objectionable to citizens. It should be noted, however, that most proponents of 
neutrality of justification do not invoke the idea that the neutrality principle is itself 
independent of conceptions of the good. As Wall & Klosko explain, ‘[n]o clear-headed 
proponent of state neutrality has ever claimed that the neutrality principle is itself morally 
neutral. As a moral principle, it is plainly incompatible with moral ideals that reject it’ (Wall 
& Klosko, 2003b: 12). Clearly the justificatory process will have an impact on the content of 
the policies that the state is permitted to pursue, and the different approaches to the process 
will alter the nature of that impact. I examine the approaches found in Rawls and Barry; they 
lend themselves well to my purposes as they provide different ways of squaring charitable 
purposes with neutrality of justification. If the purposes themselves were considered neutral 
then affording charitable status to organisations that pursue solely those purposes would not 
encounter the problem set out at the end of section two. The state would be facilitating the 
pursuit of goods that are neutral between conceptions of the good.  
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Abstraction 
 
As noted earlier, Barry asserts that it is not possible for the school curriculum to be neutral. 
He claims that it is absurd for it to be neutral since it must inevitably encounter ideas about 
the good. In response, Arneson argues that what Barry finds absurd is in fact entirely possible. 
He writes: 
Given that what we have in mind is not neutrality of effect but 
neutrality of justification, we can fix a school curriculum by appealing 
only to neutral conceptions of people’s individual rights coupled with 
uncontroversial ideas of the good. If everyone agrees that basic 
literacy and mathematical competency are good, we can appeal to the 
idea that it is fair that every person have fair opportunity to attain 
some reasonable threshold level of literacy and mathematical 
competence, and run public schools on this basis. (Arneson, 2003: 
210) 
Just as Arneson’s suggestion would entail excluding contentious matters, like religious 
studies, from the curriculum, so too would the present list of charitable purposes require 
revision. It would require restricting the purposes to those we find uncontroversial. Some of 
the present categories do conform to this requirement such as general education, health and 
poverty, whereas categories like religion and the arts are likely to be disputed. Removing the 
latter purposes, particularly in the case of religious organisations, would require repealing the 
well-established common law legacy. The dilemma is between upholding the tradition to 
permit religious groups charitable status and the principle of liberal neutrality. Let us now turn 
to a possible solution found in Barry.  
 
Though Barry is opposed to extending neutrality to non-justice-based issues, he does in fact 
provide us with a way of overcoming such disputes. As an illustration, take disagreements 
about which religion, if any, is true. How then is the state to establish freedom of religion 
without invoking judgements about the competing conceptions of the good in question? For 
Barry, we ought to establish a description of the good that is neutral between all disputants. 
Often this will mean abstracting the good to a level that neither promotes nor discourages 
specific conceptions. So the neutral description in this case would be the ‘right to pursue 
one’s religion’. The terms of the right do not invite disagreement as they make no reference as 
to the value of religious faiths. If it were described as ‘“being saved from eternal damnation” 
then this is something we would all like to have done to us – but that description depends 
upon prior identification of the true religion’ (Barry, 1995: 83). This would merely be framing 
the freedom in the terms of the original dispute.  
 
Can we apply Barry’s notion of neutral description to the charitable purposes found in the 
2006 Act? The task is to specify charitable purposes in such a way that does invoke particular 
conceptions of the good in question. This will in some cases, of course, change the nature of 
the policy. For instance, the ‘promotion of high standards of the arts’ invites disagreement 
about what are ‘high standards’ and what artistic pursuits are capable of high standards. A 
neutral description would render it the ‘the promotion of the arts’ provided of course that what 
constitutes ‘the arts’ is not subject to differing conceptions of the good. The category 
concerning religious organisations, however, does not require revision. No specific religions 
are stated and the criteria are carefully formulated to be wholly inclusive of different faiths. 
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It is problematic, however, to abstract charitable purposes to a level of non-controversy in 
terms of adequately maintaining state neutrality. When affording charitable status and tax 
advantages, it would surely need to ascertain how a given organisation would go about 
pursuing the good in question so as to ensure it was not a specious claim. Indeed as it stands, a 
key role of the Charity Commission is to hold charities accountable to their donors, 
beneficiaries and the public (Charity Commission, 2006). For the question at hand, a specious 
claim is one that appeals to a broad neutral purpose but on closer inspection is in fact non-
neutral. For example, were a charity to pursue ‘good health’ it would need to demonstrate 
how it intends to do so, such as researching causes and/or treatment of certain cancers or 
perhaps simply disseminating information on healthy diets. Simply abstracting the description 
of charitable purposes would allow an organisation to state its aims in particularly vague 
terms such as ‘good health’ then pursue a seemingly controversial and foreseeable 
interpretation such as homeopathy or other ‘alternative’ medicines. The state would thereby 
be affording privileges to organisations with non-neutral aims. In this sense abstract, broad 
categories are in fact self-defeating for state neutrality.  
 
Neutral Goods 
 
I have argued that the existing categories of charitable purposes allow in some cases the state 
to affirm conceptions of the good that are reasonably objectionable for some, perhaps many, 
citizens. We may, however, set out goods that one would pursue even when placed in a 
position that is neutral between conceptions of the good. If charitable purposes were set 
according to these neutral goods the state would then not be seen to favour conceptions of the 
good held by some citizens but not others. Two possible ways of defining ‘neutral goods’ are 
goods that are ‘generally accepted’ or ‘not reasonably objectionable’. The former would 
probably require a survey of people’s values and beliefs; goods would then be neutral if they 
correlate with the goods people actually hold in society. Besides the immense practical 
difficulties this would entail, neutralists have theoretical reasons to dismiss defining neutral 
goods in such a way. One pitfall is that it opens the neutralist position to the challenge that it 
collapses into perfectionism. If goods are neutral merely because many people consider them 
to be valuable it appears we are making similar claims as the perfectionist with regards to the 
value of conceptions of the good.  
 
The reasoning underlying the second definition helps differentiate neutrality from 
perfectionism as it sets certain constraints on what goods can be neutral independently of 
what people hold to be valuable. These constraints usually conform to liberal values hence 
racist and sexist views, for example, are precluded under the ‘not reasonably objectionable’ 
definition. I shall examine the issue of liberal values in more detail shortly. Of course it may 
(and often is) the case that ‘generally accepted’ and ‘not reasonably objectionable’ goods 
correlate, but the reasoning behind each is quite different. I think it is no coincidence then that 
neutralists generally hold ‘not reasonably objectionable’ as the definition of neutral goods.  I 
shall follow the published literature in this respect.  
 
A prominent example of neutral goods in the liberal tradition is Rawls’ ‘primary goods’. They 
include basic liberties opportunities, income, wealth and the social bases of self-respect 
(Rawls, 1999: 54-55; Rawls, 2005: 308-9). Following Norman Daniels, we may also include 
health here (Daniels, 1985: 42-48). Rawls labels these ‘primary goods’ as they are things that 
are ‘supposed a rational man wants whatever else he wants’ (Rawls, 1999: 79). It follows the 
neutrality of justification reasoning given that in the original position principles are chosen 
rationally but in ignorance of, among other things, one’s conception of the good. Accordingly, 
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it is not possible to appeal to the superiority of particular conceptions of the good. I believe 
that the goods, arranged by the two principles of justice, to be applicable to charity law. 
Rawls’ focus is the basic structure of society but in light of the problems of narrow neutrality 
we could use the notion of neutral goods to determine neutral categories of charitable 
purposes. An objection may be that primary goods should not apply to legislation concerning 
charity since, after all, they relate to principles of justice. Primary goods should be pursued as 
a matter of duty by the state, not voluntarily in the form of charitable organisations. That 
might be correct as an ideal, but in reality charities are often needed to provide services that 
the state is unable or unwilling to do so. People may well regret the need for charities to 
pursue these goods but presumably would not object to their efforts.   
 
How then do we fashion charity law according to primary goods and what implications does 
this have for the existing legislation? In short, organisations that seek to promote primary 
goods would be candidates for charitable status. When taken in conjunction with the two 
principles, they are specific goods that are practicable as a set of charitable purposes; that is to 
say, they are not too abstract or vague. The promotion of basic rights and liberties would be 
one such purpose. This may entail, as the current law specifies, the raising of awareness of 
rights issues and securing their enforcement (Charity Commission, 2009). Indeed, this could 
be seen to sustain the existing category of the advancement of human rights as the two sets of 
rights broadly reflect one another. Interpreting the good of income or wealth as a charitable 
pursuit is somewhat less straightforward, but the advancement of distributing wealth to the 
least well off may well serve the difference principle. It seems plain to me that the present 
‘relief of poverty’ category can be incorporated into this Rawlsian pursuit. Depending on 
one’s account of the social bases for self-respect, it could give rise to many charitable 
pursuits; we can at least, I think, correlate it with the existing category of relief for those in 
need or hardship. A final example of the consistency between the current legislation and the 
Rawlsian version, albeit modified by Daniels, would be the advancement of health. Other 
categories that do not fall under the framework of primary goods could not be upheld on the 
basis that they do not meet the test of neutrality set out above. The legislation would have to 
be revised to remove such purposes as the promotion of the arts, amateur sport, animal 
welfare, moral improvement and spiritual welfare.   
 
One may object to the removal of such categories on the grounds that competing conceptions 
of the good might still share the view that say, art or amateur sport, is better than no art or no 
amateur sport. Let us assume that it is agreed that art in society is better than no art in society. 
Thus we can be sure that it would not be reasonably objectionable were the state to encourage 
the arts by charitable recognition of art groups, providing they meet other legal requirements. 
This should not pose a problem for liberal neutralists given that public reason is unanimous in 
this case. However, while we may safely make the above assumption, it is not possible to be 
certain about what kind of art people view as valuable. After all, many people subscribe to the 
adage that ‘there is no accounting for taste’. Thus, we must be less certain when facilitated art 
groups by the designation of charitable status. The neutralist then has two options: dismiss all 
arts as a charitable category or set out policies that make clear that all art groups, other legal 
considerations permitting, may potentially be charities. Whether some arts receive greater 
promotion as a result of charitable status is down to citizens’ choice to form charities. 
Deciding between these two options depends on establishing that it is not reasonably 
objectionable that art is better than no art.  
 
In Political Liberalism Rawls is quite explicit that liberal neutrality will indeed (and ought to) 
favour liberal values over other competing values (Rawls, 2005: 194). The prominence of 
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liberal values in the neutralist position should not be lost when considering charity law. 
Consider again the example of abortion advice centres. If their purpose were defined as open-
minded information points that covered all possibilities and views on abortion then it would 
not be reasonably objectionable given that such a purpose conforms to core liberal values 
such as autonomy. We might suppose that some catholic groups, for example, would still 
object to centres purely on the basis that abortion is being affirmed as an option. But for the 
liberal neutralist this need not be of concern8. This example reveals that purposes that may 
appear reasonably objectionable can be reformed such that they are controversial in a non-
problematic way for the neutralist. Though of course this is further modification of the 
existing charity law. 
  
We should be cautious, however, about restricting charitable purposes according to Rawls’ 
account given that they are indeed primary goods, intended to inform the arrangement of the 
basic structure. The existing legislation would perhaps fare better if we could establish a more 
general set of goods that were found to be uncontroversial between different conceptions of 
the good. Animal sanctuaries, for example, are not a primary good but I do not foresee them 
giving rise to disputes between conceptions of the good. Some may well insist, and 
reasonably so, that the relief of poverty or advancement of health is a more urgent pursuit, but 
this does not undermine an animal sanctuary being a viable neutral purpose. The urgency and 
extent to which purposes are pursued would be determined by the support received by the 
given organisations from the public. Provided we have sufficient grounds for assuming such 
purposes lend themselves to all concerned conceptions of the good, it seems satisfactory 
according to the general liberal doctrine to include them alongside primary goods.  
 
Conclusion 
 
We return then to the methodological issue raised in the introduction; why then would the 
above serve as a satisfactory reconciliation between liberal neutrality and charity law? I have 
attempted to employ a version of reflective equilibrium, assessing the implications of each 
conception for both liberal neutrality and charity law. On the one hand, I have argued that 
certain proposals would alter the charity law to such an extent or in such a way that it is 
unacceptable. How can this be so? I have taken it for granted that we wish to preserve a 
vibrant charitable culture in the UK, and it is evident that charitable status is a valuable 
commodity to organisations. In this case liberal neutrality would have to be abandoned. 
 
On the other hand, one might think the neutralist ought not to be forced into complete retreat 
in light of the tension with this particular policy. I argue that insofar as one is neutralist, one 
must accept that significant changes will have to be made to long-standing principles of 
charity law. Several categories would have be removed on the basis that no practicable policy 
option can be found that passes the test of neutrality and/or many purposes would have be 
characterised in such a way that is in tune with liberal neutrality. In this respect, a 
reconciliation point can be established. 
 
The failure to account for charity law as it stands is, I think, because neutrality does not have 
the tools to account for embedded cultural values of society, of which the charitable sector 
appears to be a good example. After all, charity law and the charitable purposes therein are 
not the result of a radical or whimsical process. Rather the law is the culmination of traditions 
and principles of charitable activity that track the needs and culture of the day dating back to 
                                                
8 Not least because Rawls and others assert the right to have an abortion (see Rawls, 2005: 243 fn. 32). It is a 
question of whether or not the advice centre is neutral about the use of the right.  
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the 1601 Act. Though the notion that the state must not predicate its decisions on the value of 
conceptions of the good may prima facie be sound, it loses its appeal where it radically alters 
well-established principles and values. Thus, if one holds dear the principles, traditions or 
intuitions of charity law then one ought to abandon liberal neutrality hitherto defended.  
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